reversing four of eight counts in an indictment,

Willette v. Fischer, No. 06-1422
Grant of habeas petition, reversing four of eight counts in an indictment, is remanded for entry of a modified judgment that vacates only three counts, where punishments for those counts was unconstitutionally imposed.

there is a clearly established federal due process protection against a trial court's reliance on materially false information at sentencing;

Stewart v. Erwin, No. 05-4635
Denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a sexual battery case is reversed and remanded to supplement the record or grant the writ as: 1) although there is no clearly established federal constitutional right to full disclosure of all information used by a trial judge in determining a defendant's sentence; 2) there is a clearly established federal due process protection against a trial court's reliance on materially false information at sentencing; and 3) it was not possible to ascertain whether such a violation might have occurred here, where a portion of the materials used in determining the sentence have been withheld from federal court review, and where the limited record suggested a reasonable possibility that at least some of the sentencing information might have been errone

Rare Confrontation Clause Winner

Vasquez v. Jones, No. 04-2274
Denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the petition where: 1) petitioner established that the state court violated his Confrontation Clause right to impeach a witness' credibility with his criminal record; 2) the state court's resolution of this claim represents an unreasonable application of Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence; and 3) the error was not harmless under the Brecht standard

Rule 60 (b) is not a habeas petition

Zakrzewski v. McDonough, No. 06-12804
Denial of motion seeking post-judgment relief under rule 60(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., where motion was made on the ground that former habeas counsel perpetrated a fraud on the court, is vacated as petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion was not a second or successive habeas petition as construed by the district court

Death Penalty, mental retardation

Simpson v. Norris, No. 06-2823
In a death penalty case, denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is vacated and remanded where the district court erred in holding that petitioner had defaulted an eighth amendment claim under Atkins that his mental retardation made him ineligible for the death penalty. Re

Procedural bar exceptions

Kuenzel v. Allen, No. 06-11986
Denial of habeas petition is vacated and remanded where the district court has not addressed the issue of whether petitioner has satisfied the exceptions to the procedural bar announced in Siebert v. Allen, 455 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2006), and where the district court erred in holding that the intervening authority of Pace v. DiGuigliemo, 125 S. Ct. 1807 (2005), effectively overruled the decision in Siebert

state court's application of the Strickland standard for a defense counsel's duty

Ramonez v. Berghuis, No. 06-1852
Denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging a conviction for home invasion, assault with intent to do great bodily harm, and aggravated stalking is reversed where a state court's application of the Strickland standard for a defense counsel's duty to investigate was unreasonable in regard to his failure to investigate and call three witnesses to the alleged crime.

Pro-se Habeas winner

Ogle v. Johnson, No. 06-11074
Dismissal of federal habeas petition is reversed where a pro se petitioner fairly presents his claim to a state habeas court when he makes a bare allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his state habeas petition and then describes in briefs and testimony in later proceedings several instances of alleged ineffective assistance

DNA Winner

In McKithen v. Brown, Judge Calabresi opens his decision as follows:"Eighty-four years ago, Judge Learned Hand observed that '[o]ur procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted,' but posited, optimistically, that '[i]t is an unreal dream.' United States v. Garrison, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). Today, with the advance of forensic DNA technology, our desire to join Learned Hand's optimism has given way to the reality of wrongful convictions -- a reality which challenges us to reaffirm our commitment to the principle that the innocent should be freed."The case involves an attempt by a prisoner to a post-conviction constitutional right to access to DNA testing, which, he asserts, might exonerate him. The District Court dismissed the action, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but the Second Circuit reversed. The decision can be found here.

CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE, HABEAS CORPUS

Howard v. US Bureau of Prisons, No. 06-3315
In an inmate's pro se habeas corpus proceedings claiming that, during two disciplinary proceedings against him for assaulting another prisoner and possessing drug paraphernalia, federal penitentiary officials violated his due process rights, dismissal of the habeas petition is affirmed in part, but vacated in part where petitioner was denied the opportunity to present potentially exculpatory evidence at one of his hearings

dna

In McKithen v. Brown, Judge Calabresi opens his decision as follows:"Eighty-four years ago, Judge Learned Hand observed that '[o]ur procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted,' but posited, optimistically, that '[i]t is an unreal dream.' United States v. Garrison, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). Today, with the advance of forensic DNA technology, our desire to join Learned Hand's optimism has given way to the reality of wrongful convictions -- a reality which challenges us to reaffirm our commitment to the principle that the innocent should be freed."The case involves an attempt by a prisoner to a post-conviction constitutional right to access to DNA testing, which, he asserts, might exonerate him. The District Court dismissed the action, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but the Second Circuit reversed.The decision can be found here.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to the district court, for it to consider whether there exists a constitutional right on the basis of which Plaintiff-Appellant might be able to obtain the relief he requests, and if there is such a right, whether, once the district court defines the contours of that right, Plaintiff- Appellant’s claim is collaterally-estopped by the earlier state court decisions.